Chapter 7: Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG)

Study of the Title I, Part A Grant Program Mathematical Formulas

Chapter 7: Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG)—Formula Analyses

Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG) are made to states to provide school districts with additional funding for low-income and disadvantaged children. EFIG accounted for approximately $3.3 billion (23 percent) of the total Title I funds allocated in fiscal year 2015 (FY 15) (table 1.A), and the average EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was $282 (all allocations herein are averages).

Highlights

Arizona and Idaho received the lowest or among the lowest Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) allocations per formula-eligible child for both the final allocations and for most allocations when single or multiple provisions were removed from the formula (table 7.A). For example, when the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed in combination, the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from $241 in Idaho to $684 in Vermont, a difference of $443 or 184 percent.
The EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was higher for large cities than all other locales in all analyses involving the removal of single provisions; this contrasted with the pattern for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants. However, when multiple provisions were removed (involving the hold harmless and number weighting provisions), the highest allocation was for remote rural areas, and the second-highest allocation was for large cities (table 7.B). For example, when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, remote rural areas received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($341) than all other locales, which ranged from $243 for small suburban areas and $245 for large suburban areas to $328 for large cities (figure 7.9).
In all the analyses involving the removal of single provisions, the highest poverty quarter had the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child, and the lowest poverty quarter had the lowest allocation (table 7.B). For example, when the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the highest poverty quarter had the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($357); the allocation was lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter ($201) and second lowest for the lowest poverty quarter ($205) (figure 7.10).
Within each poverty quarter, the largest districts generally had a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child than smaller districts, except when multiple provisions were removed from the formula (table 7.B). For example, when the SPPE provision was removed, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation ($414) than all other districts in that quarter; this allocation was also the highest among districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from $138 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to $378 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter.
Districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) generally had a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child than districts of smaller population sizes, except when the number weighting provision was removed from the formula, either alone or in combination (table 7.B). For example, after removal of the percentage weighting provision, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more ($344), but the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) ($315) (figure 7.6). In contrast, after removal of the number weighting provision, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of less than 300 ($350), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more ($322) (figure 7.5).

Top

Formula Alternatives

This chapter examines several unique formula alternatives compared with the other grant types due to the complexity of the EFIG formula. Similar to the other grants, EFIG allocations were computed using the formula-eligibility criteria only, as well as alternatives that exclude the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), state minimum, and hold harmless provisions. When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the allocation computations were essentially made on a per eligible child basis, so the differences in Basic Grant allocations and Concentration Grant allocations among districts of various types were smaller than those observed under other alternatives. For EFIG—and Targeted Grants—the number and percentage weighing provisions were retained. Therefore, in contrast to the patterns for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants, substantial variations existed for allocations based only on the formula-eligibility criteria. When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the same expenditure per student was used for each state, and there were no minimum and maximum thresholds. In general, removal of the SPPE provision meant that states with lower expenditures per student received higher allocations, while states with higher expenditures per student received lower allocations. Excluding the state minimum provision meant that small population states typically received lower allocations since there was no minimum threshold on funding levels.

The hold harmless provision limits the amount a district’s allocation can decrease from one year to the next due to population changes. It is important to note that unless a formula provision is removed in conjunction with the hold harmless provision, the long-term impact of removing the other provision may not be fully reflected in the resulting allocation. So, when a provision such as the state minimum is removed from the formula and the hold harmless provision is maintained, the districts in the state are limited to a reduction of no more than 15 percent per year. The hold harmless provision moderates the long-term impact of removing the state minimum provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions are fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year’s decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

EFIG funds are distributed to states based on two unique variables that are not part of the formulas for the other three grants: the state effort provision (the measure of state effort to provide financial support compared with its relative wealth) and the state equity provision (the degree to which education expenditures within a state are equalized) (see Introduction, Methodology for Allocating Federal Title I Funds for more information). Unlike the other three types of Title I grants, EFIG are first computed at the state level and then distributed to districts within each state. The other district-level calculations, such as the hold harmless provision, only pertain to districts within a state, since the overall state amount is fixed. EFIG allocations are made to states based on state total eligibility (unweighted) and SPPE. EFIG provide funds to districts according to number weighting and percentage weighting provisions that are the same as those for Targeted Grants. The hold harmless and weighting provisions are applied only at the district level.

When the number weighting provision was removed, districts only received additional funding if they had high percentages of formula-eligible children, which favored the highest poverty districts, regardless of size. When the percentage weighting provision was removed, the allocations were based only on the actual number of formula-eligible children, which tended to favor larger districts regardless of poverty level. When the state effort provision was removed, states no longer benefited or were penalized for spending relatively high or low percentages of their per capita income on education. Removing the state equity provision benefited states with larger variations in spending within the state.

Three combinations of provision removals are analyzed in this chapter, all including removal of the hold harmless provision. One combination looks at removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions, which provides an example of the long-term impact of removal of the number weighting provision by not limiting the annual reductions. Another combination looks at removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions, and the third combination looks at removal of the state minimum, hold harmless, number weighting provisions.

Top

Formula-Eligibility Criteria Only

For the formula-eligibility criteria for EFIG (as well as for Targeted Grants) retained the number weighting and percentage weighting provisions. Thus, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered in the allocation computations, the differences between the highest and lowest EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child across most school district characteristics remained relatively large compared with the smaller differences for Basic Grants and Concentration Grants. The exception to the relatively wide ranges in EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered was for the state-level allocations, when the range was narrower than the range for the final allocations. The allocations ranged from $280 in 17 states to $312 in New Hampshire, a range of $31 or 11 percent (table 7.A). The narrowness of this range, when compared with the final allocation range ($465 or 212 percent), was primarily due to lower allocations for states at the top of the range. For example, the allocation was $392 lower in Vermont and $377 lower in Wyoming, compared with the final allocations. Overall, 27 states and the District of Columbia had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 23 states and Puerto Rico had increases.

Similar to the final allocations and allocations with other provisions removed, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($439) than all other locales, which ranged from $159 for fringe towns to $335 for midsize cities (table 7.B; figure 7.1). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe towns was $280 or 177 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations ($189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, large cities and midsize cities had the largest increase (both +$44), and remote rural areas had the largest decrease (-$145).

Figure 7.1. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation when only formula-eligibility criteria were considered, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).
² EFIG are provided to districts in which the number of formula-eligible children (without the application of the formula weights) is at least 10 and that number constitutes at least 5 percent of the district’s 5- to 17-year-old population.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), “Local Education Agency Universe Survey,” 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, districts in the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($335), which was $17 lower than the final allocation. Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter ($193), which was $16 lower than the final allocation. The EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child in the highest poverty quarter was $142 or 73 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter ($193).

Similar to the final allocations, when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($452) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from $131 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to $434 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of $452, compared with an allocation of $169 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of $283 or 168 percent). This range ($283) between the largest and smallest districts was more than twice as wide as the range for the final allocations ($118). Compared with the final allocations, applying only the formula-eligibility criteria resulted in the largest increase (+$68) for the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-$134) for the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter.

When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) had a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($386) than districts of other sizes, similar to the pattern for the final allocations. The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 1,000 to 2,499 ($139). Also, the allocations for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) ($158), districts with a population of 300 to 599 ($145), and districts with a population of 600 to 999 ($143) were lower than for districts with larger population sizes. The difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was $248, which was more than twice the difference for the final allocations ($115). Compared with the final allocations, using only the formula-eligibility criteria resulted in the largest increase (+$49) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more and the largest decrease (-$175) for districts with a population of less than 300. Districts with a population of 300 to 599 had a decrease of $121 in their EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child, and districts with a population of 600 to 999 had a decrease of $111.

Top

Removal of State per Pupil Expenditure (SPPE)

When the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision was removed from the formula, the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child increased in lower-spending states and decreased in higher-spending states. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the school district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the SPPE provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the SPPE provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year’s decline were redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds. Contrary to the formula for Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, and Targeted Grants, the determination of EFIG state allocations preceded the distribution to individual districts within each state. While there was an attempt to limit reductions of more than 15 percent of the prior year’s allocation to each eligible district, if a state’s allocation dropped below a certain level (and since there was no state hold harmless provision), there was not sufficient funding to preserve the legislated hold harmless amounts for the state’s districts. In this formula alternative, 11 states—either at the maximum SPPE amount or at least significantly above the national average SPPE—had their district hold harmless allocations reduced to some fraction of the statutory amounts.

When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child increased in lower-spending states and decreased in higher-spending states. For example, compared with the final allocations, the largest increases in the allocations when the SPPE provision was removed were in Arkansas and Puerto Rico (both +$27), and the largest decreases were in Connecticut (-$73) and Maryland (-$71) (table 7.A). The allocations ranged from $241 in Idaho to $684 in Vermont, a difference of $443 or 184 percent. This difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations ($465 or 212 percent). Overall, 19 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 31 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

Similar to the final allocations and allocations with other provisions removed, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($391) than all other locales, which ranged from $201 for fringe towns to $312 for remote rural areas (table 7.B; figure 7.2). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe towns was $190 or 94 percent, which was similar to the difference for the final allocations ($189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed, the differences in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child by locale were relatively small, with differences under $7.

Figure 7.2. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

¹ To create the poverty quarters, all school districts are ranked, from the highest to the lowest, according to their percentage of formula-eligible 5- to 17-year-old children. Districts are divided into quarters based on the percentage of all 5- to 17-year-old children they serve, such that each quarter includes districts serving 25 percent of the 5- to 17-year-old children in the United States (including Puerto Rico).
² A state’s adjusted SPPE cannot be less than 32 percent of the U.S. average SPPE or more than 48 percent of the U.S. average SPPE. For EFIG, however, these rules differ slightly: 34 percent of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the minimum (instead of 32 percent) and 46 percent of the U.S. average SPPE is used as the maximum (instead of 48 percent).
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Title I Allocation File, 2015; National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), “Local Education Agency Universe Survey,” 2013–14, Provisional Version 1a.

When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($349). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter ($192). The allocation for the highest poverty quarter was $157 or 82 percent higher than the allocation for the lowest poverty quarter, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations ($143). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed, the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was $17 lower for the lowest poverty quarter and $2 lower for the highest poverty quarter; in contrast, there was an increase of $8 for the second-highest poverty quarter and an increase of $2 for the second-lowest poverty quarter.

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation ($414) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from $138 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to $378 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of $414, compared with an allocation of $304 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of $110 or 36 percent). This range ($110) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was narrower than the range for the final allocations ($118). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE provision resulted in the largest increase (+$19) for the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-$24) for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter.

Similar to the pattern for the final allocations, when the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) was higher than for districts of other population sizes. In contrast to the pattern when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered but similar to the pattern for the final allocations, both districts with the largest and districts with the smallest population sizes had the highest EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child. The highest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more ($343), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) ($329). The difference in the allocations between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was $127, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations ($115). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE provision resulted in lower EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for smaller districts (ranging from less than -$1 to -$9) and a higher allocation for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (+$6).

Top

Removal of State Minimum

The state minimum provision provides a minimum allocation threshold for each state. When the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child increased slightly for many states but decreased substantially for many of the states receiving the state minimum allocation. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the school district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the state minimum provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the state minimum provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year’s decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

Nine states and the District of Columbia met the EFIG state minimum provision (figure I.4). Removal of the state minimum provision from the formula had an impact of less than $5 per formula-eligible child for the majority of states, but it reduced the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child by more than $100 in 6 of the 10 states that received the state minimum allocation (table 7.A). For example, when the state minimum provision was removed, Vermont’s allocation decreased by $352, North Dakota’s decreased by $348, Wyoming’s decreased by $296, South Dakota’s decreased by $187, New Hampshire’s decreased by $176, and Alaska’s decreased by $161. The states ranged from $221 in Idaho to $405 in the District of Columbia, a difference of $184 or 83 percent. This difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations ($465 or 212 percent). Overall, 9 states and the District of Columbia had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 41 states and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

When the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($398) than all other locales, which ranged from $207 for fringe towns to $292 for midsize cities (table 7.B; figure 7.3). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe towns was $191 or 92 percent, which was similar to the difference for the final allocations ($189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed, remote rural areas had the largest decrease (-$24) and remote towns had the second-largest decrease (-$9); in contrast, large cities had the largest increase (+$3).

Figure 7.3. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state minimum provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

When the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($353). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter ($203). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed, there was a decrease of $6 in the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for the lowest poverty quarter and a decrease of $2 for the second-lowest poverty quarter; in contrast, there was an increase of $2 for the highest poverty quarter and an increase of $1 for the second-highest poverty quarter. When the state minimum provision was removed, the difference between the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter ($353) and the lowest poverty quarter ($203) was $150 or 74 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations ($143 or 68 percent).

Similar to the final allocations, when the state minimum provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation ($425) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from $159 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to $379 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of $425, compared with an allocation of $300 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of $125 or 42 percent). This range ($125) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was wider than the range for the final allocations ($118) but narrower than the range when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered ($283). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state minimum provision resulted in the largest increase (+$4) for the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-$14) for the smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter.

After removal of the state minimum provision from the formula, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) ($340), but the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) ($291). In contrast to the pattern when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered but similar to the pattern for the final allocations, both districts with the largest and districts with the smallest population sizes had the highest allocations. Similar to the final allocations, the lowest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 ($223). After removal of the state minimum provision, the difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was $117, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations ($115). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state minimum provision resulted in the largest decreases in allocations for districts with a population of less than 300 (-$41), districts with a population of 300 to 599 (-$18), and districts with a population of 600 to 999 (-$11). The largest increase was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (+$2).

Top

Removal of Hold Harmless

Removal of the hold harmless provision allows the current formula provisions and distributions of formula-eligible children to have a full impact on the allocations; with the hold harmless provision the allocations are limited by the maximum yearly reductions. Removal of the hold harmless provision permits reductions of over 15 percent for school districts that may have relatively large decreases in the number of formula-eligible children compared with other districts. Due to the EFIG allocation procedure, removal of the hold harmless provision did not change the FY 15 state-level allocations compared with the final allocations.

Similar to the final allocation and allocations with other provisions removed, when the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($396) than all other locales, which ranged from $204 for fringe towns to $298 for midsize cities (table 7.B; figure 7.4). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe towns was $192 or 94 percent, which was similar to the difference for the final allocations ($189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed, remote rural areas had the largest decrease (-$22) and distant rural areas had the second-largest decrease (-$9); in contrast, midsize cities had the largest increase (+$7).

Figure 7.4. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with hold harmless provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

When the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($347). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter ($215). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed, there was an increase of $6 in the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for the lowest poverty quarter, an increase of $4 for the second-lowest poverty quarter, and an increase of $2 for the second-highest poverty quarter. In contrast, there was a decrease of $4 for the highest poverty quarter. When the hold harmless provision was removed, the difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the highest poverty quarter ($347) and the lowest poverty quarter ($215) was $133 or 62 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations ($143 or 68 percent).

Similar to the final allocations, when the hold harmless provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($428) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from $168 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to $375 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of $428, compared with an allocation of $286 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of $143 or 50 percent). This range ($143) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was larger than the range for the final allocations ($118) but smaller than the range when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered ($283). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless provision resulted in the largest increase (+$9) for the second-largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-$16) for the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter.

After removal of the hold harmless provision from the formula, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) ($342), but the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) ($275). In contrast to the pattern when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered but similar to the pattern for the final allocations, both districts with the largest and districts with the smallest population sizes had the highest EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child. Similar to the final allocations, the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 ($220). The difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was $122, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations ($115). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless provision resulted in lower allocations for districts with populations under 10,000 and an increase of $4 for districts with a population of 25,000 or more. The largest decreases in EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child were for districts with a population of less than 300 (-$57), districts with a population of 300 to 599 (-$24), and districts with a population of 600 to 999 (-$20).

Top

Removal of Number Weighting

Removal of the number weighting provision from the formula decreased the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child compared with the final allocations, since some large but low-poverty districts benefited from the number weighting provision. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the number weighting provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the number weighting provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year’s decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds. Due to the EFIG allocation procedure to states, removal of the number weighting provision did not change the state-level allocations compared with the final allocations.

Similar to the final allocations and other allocations with single provisions removed, when the number weighting provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($379) than all other locales, which ranged from $219 for small suburban areas to $330 for remote rural areas (table 7.B; figure 7.5). The difference between the allocations for large cities and small suburban areas was $160 or 73 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations ($189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed, large cities had the largest decrease (-$16); in contrast, distant towns had the largest increase (+$23).

Figure 7.5. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with number weighting provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015<

When the number weighting provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($358). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter ($206) and second lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter ($207). Compared with the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed, there was an increase of $6 in the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter; in contrast, there were decreases of $3 to $6 for lower poverty quarters. When the number weighting provision was removed, the difference in the allocations between the highest poverty quarter ($358) and the lowest poverty quarter ($206) was $151 or 73 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations ($143 or 68 percent).

Similar to the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($401) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from $178 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to $376 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of $401, compared with an allocation of $325 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of $76 or 23 percent). This range ($76) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was narrower than the range for the final allocations ($118) and allocations with any other single provision removed. Compared with the final allocation, removal of the number weighting provision resulted in the largest increase (+$24) for the second-smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-$31) for the largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter.

After removal of the number weighting provision from the formula, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) ($350), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) ($322). Removal of the number weighting provision was the one exception to the general pattern of the largest districts having the highest EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child when removing a single provision. Similar to the final allocations, when the number weighting provision was removed, the lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 ($240). The difference in the allocations between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was $110, which was slightly smaller than the difference for the final allocations ($115).

Removal of the number weighting provision from the formula resulted in higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for smaller districts and a decrease of $16 for districts with a population of 25,000 or more. For districts with populations under 10,000, the allocations with the removal of the number weighting provision were between $17 and $19 higher than the final allocations. Compared with the final allocations, removal of the number weighting provision resulted in the largest increase (+$19) for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 and the largest decrease (-$16) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more.

Top

Removal of Percentage Weighting

Removal of the percentage weighting provision from the formula generally resulted in decreases in EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for high-poverty, smaller school districts, while districts with populations of 10,000 or more received higher allocations, because of the number weighting provision. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the percentage weighting provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the percentage weighting provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year’s decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds. Due to the EFIG allocation procedure, removal of the percentage weighting provision did not change the state-level allocations compared with the final allocations.

Similar to the final allocations and allocations with other provisions removed, when the percentage weighting provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($403) than all other locales, which ranged from $200 for fringe towns to $294 for remote rural areas and midsize cities (table 7.B; figure 7.6). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe towns was $203 or 101 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations ($189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the percentage weighting provision was removed, large cities had the largest increase (+$8); in contrast, remote rural areas had the largest decrease (-$16).

Figure 7.6. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with percentage weighting provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

When the percentage weighting provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($347). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter ($216) and second-lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter ($218). Compared with the final allocations, when the percentage weighting provision was removed, there was a decrease of $4 in the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter; in contrast, there were increases of $1 to $7 for lower poverty quarters. When the percentage weighting provision was removed, the difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the highest poverty quarter ($347) and the lowest poverty quarter ($216) was $131 or 61 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations ($143 or 68 percent).

Similar to the final allocations, when the percentage weighting provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation ($428) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from $169 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to $386 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of $428, compared with an allocation of $279 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of $149 or 53 percent). This range ($149) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was larger than the range for the final allocations ($118) and the allocations for any of the other formula alternatives, except for when only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered ($283). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the percentage weighting provision resulted in the largest increase (+$8) for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-$23) for the smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter.

After removal of the percentage weighting provision from the formula, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) ($344), but the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) ($315). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 ($216), and the allocations for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 ($218) and districts with a population of 1,000 to 2,499 children ($249) were slightly higher. The difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was $128, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations ($115). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the percentage weighting provision resulted in the largest increase (+$7) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more and the largest decrease (-$17) for districts with a population of less than 300.

Top

Removal of State Effort

The state effort provision (the measure of state effort to provide financial support compared with its relative wealth) affected the state-level EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child, unlike some other provisions that affected only the school district-level allocations within states. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the state effort provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the state effort provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year’s decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

Compared with the final allocations, when the state effort provision was removed from the formula, the largest decreases in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child were in Connecticut (-$22), Maryland (-$21), and New Jersey (-$21), and the largest increases were in Minnesota (+$13) and Iowa, Virginia, Kansas, Washington, and Puerto Rico (all +$12) (table 7.A). Overall, 20 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 30 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

Similar to the final allocations and allocations with other provisions removed, when the state effort provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($396) than the other locales, which ranged from $203 for fringe towns and $204 for small suburban areas to $309 for remote rural areas (table 7.B; figure 7.7). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe towns was $193 or 95 percent, which was slightly larger than the difference for the final allocations ($189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state effort provision was removed, small suburban areas and fringe towns had the largest decreases (both -$14); in contrast, large suburban areas had the largest increase (+$1).

Figure 7.7. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state effort provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

When the state effort provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($351). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter ($206) and second lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter ($215). Compared with the final allocations, when the state effort provision was removed, there was a decrease of $3 in the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for the lowest poverty quarter and a decrease of $1 for the highest poverty quarter; in contrast, there were increases of $2 for the second-highest poverty quarter and $1 for the second-lowest poverty quarter. When the state effort provision was removed, the difference between the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter ($351) and the lowest poverty quarter ($206) was $145 or 70 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations ($143 or 68 percent).

Similar to the final allocations, when the state effort provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation ($422) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from $154 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to $378 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of $422, compared with allocations of $300 in both the smallest and second-smallest districts in that quarter (a range of $123 or 41 percent). This range ($123) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was slightly larger than the range for the final allocations ($118). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state effort provision resulted in the largest increase (+$8) for the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-$8) for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter.

After removal of the state effort provision from the formula, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) ($341), but the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) ($333). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 ($219). The difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was $122, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations ($115). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state effort provision resulted in the largest increase (+$3) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more and the largest decrease (-$5) for districts with a population of 1,000 to 2,499.

Top

Removal of State Equity

The state equity provision (the degree to which education expenditures within a state are equalized) is designed to increase the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child in states with smaller variations in spending by school districts within the states. Removing this factor increased the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for states with larger variations of spending by districts within the states. It is important to note that this analysis retained the hold harmless provision at the district level, which limited the reduction of funding in a specific district to no more than 15 percent in a given year. The long-term impact of removing the state equity provision was not fully reflected in this analysis. The hold harmless provision moderated the long-term impact of removing the state equity provision by limiting the impact on a district to a maximum decline of 15 percent of its Title I funds from the preceding year. Additional declines of up to 15 percent per year could occur until the formula provisions were fully met for a district. Due to the zero-sum nature of Title I allocations, funds from each year’s decline would be redistributed to other districts eligible for additional funds.

Compared with the final allocations, when the state equity provision was removed from the formula, the largest increases in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child were in Illinois (+$33) and Idaho (+$22); the largest decreases were in Puerto Rico (-$27) and Maryland (-$19) (table 7.A). Across the states, the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ranged from $241 in 9 states and Puerto Rico to $684 in Vermont, a difference of $443 or 184 percent. This was smaller than the difference for the final allocations ($465 or 212 percent). Overall, 26 states and Puerto Rico had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 24 states and the District of Columbia had no changes or increases.

Similar to the final allocations and allocations with other provisions removed, when the state equity provision was removed from the formula, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($411) than all other locales, which ranged from $199 for fringe towns and $203 for fringe rural areas to $305 for remote rural areas (table 7.B; figure 7.8). The difference between the allocations for large cities and fringe towns was $212 or 107 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations ($189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state equity provision was removed, fringe rural areas and midsize suburban areas had the largest decreases (both -$11); in contrast, large cities had the largest increase (+$16).

Figure 7.8. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state equity provision removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

When the state equity provision was removed from the formula, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($358). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the lowest poverty quarter ($199) and second lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter ($208). Compared with the final allocations, when the state equity provision was removed, there was an increase of $6 in the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter; in contrast, there were decreases of $3 to $10 for lower poverty quarters. When the state equity provision was removed, the difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the highest poverty quarter ($358) and the lowest poverty quarter ($199) was $159 or 80 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations ($143 or 68 percent).

Similar to the final allocations, when the state equity provision was removed from the formula, the largest districts within each poverty quarter had higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts. The largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a higher allocation ($433) than districts in all other poverty quarters and of all other population sizes, which ranged from $143 for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter to $388 for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. Within the highest poverty quarter, the largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of $433, compared with an allocation of $301 for the smallest districts in that quarter (a range of $132 or 44 percent). This range ($132) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was larger than the range for the final allocations ($118). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state equity provision resulted in the largest increase (+$13) for the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-$19) for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter.

After removal of the state equity provision from the formula, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) ($343), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) ($329). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 ($216). The difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was $127, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations ($115). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state equity provision resulted in the largest increase (+$6) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more and the largest decrease (-$8) for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999.

Top

Removal of Hold Harmless and Number Weighting

Removal of multiple formula provisions can lead to a better understanding of the interaction of those provisions and enable a more complete analysis of the implications of individual provisions. In particular, removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions in combination provides information on the long-term impact of removing the number weighting provision. Removing the number weighting provision alone affects the initial allocations, but it also has a long-term impact when the initial decreases for some school districts are not restricted to the one-year hold harmless reduction limits (-15 percent). Removing the number weighting provision resulted in a decrease in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for large districts because some large but low-poverty districts received additional funding from the number weighting provision. Due to the EFIG allocation procedure, removal of the number weighting provision did not change the state-level allocations compared with the final allocations. Since removing the number weighting provision had no impact on the state-level allocations, removing the hold harmless provision also did not result in any additional changes at the state level compared with the final allocations.

When the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, remote rural areas received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($341) than all other locales, which ranged from $243 for small suburban areas and $245 for large suburban areas to $328 for large cities (table 7.B; figure 7.9); this pattern contrasted with the pattern for the final allocations and allocations with single provisions removed. The difference between the allocations for remote rural areas and small suburban areas was $98 or 41 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations ($189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed, the largest increase was for distant towns (+$50), and the only decrease was for large cities (-$67).

Figure 7.9. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with hold harmless and number weighting provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

Although there was no difference between the national EFIG allocation and the national final allocation when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, there were differences within states. Large cities (or midsize cities in states where large cities were not applicable) received higher EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child than all other locales in 35 states (table 2.E); when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed, large cities (or midsize cities in states where large cities were not applicable) received higher allocations than all other locales in only 13 states (table 7.C). Remote rural areas received higher EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child than all other locales in 4 states (table 2.E); when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed, remote rural areas received higher allocations than any of the other locales in 9 states (table 7.C). After removing the hold harmless and number weighting provisions, there was only one state each where large and midsize suburban areas and fringe towns had the highest EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child within the state. For example, only in West Virginia did fringe towns have a higher allocation ($403) than all other locales within the state. The states with the smallest ranges in EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child among the locales were Wyoming ($62), Iowa ($64), and Utah ($64), while the states with the largest ranges among the locales were Michigan ($355) and New York ($351).

When the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($359) (table 7.B; figure 7.9). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter ($201) and second lowest for the lowest poverty quarter ($217). Compared with the final allocations, when the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed, there were increases of $8 in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter and for the lowest poverty quarter; in contrast, there were decreases for the second-lowest poverty quarter (-$13) and the second-highest poverty quarter (-$6). When the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed, the difference between the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter ($359) and the second-lowest poverty quarter ($201) was $158 or 79 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations ($143 or 68 percent).

When the hold harmless and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the largest districts within each poverty quarter did not have higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts; for the final allocations, the largest districts consistently had higher allocations than smaller districts. For example, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a lower allocation ($341) than smaller districts in that quarter, which ranged from $354 for the smallest districts to $373 for the second-largest districts. Within the highest poverty quarter, the second-largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of $373, compared with an allocation of $341 for the largest districts in that quarter (a range of $32 or 9 percent). This range ($32) between the largest and smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter was smaller than the range for the final allocations ($118). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increase in the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for the second-smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter (+$65) and the largest decreases for the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter (-$80) and the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter (-$79).

After removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions from the formula in combination, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) ($328), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 ($297). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 ($269). The difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was $59, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations ($115). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increase (+$50) for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 and the largest decrease (-$47) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts).

Top

Removal of State per Pupil Expenditure (SPPE), Hold Harmless, and Number Weighting

Removal of multiple provisions generally produced patterns that differed from those for the final allocations or allocations with single provisions removed. Due to the EFIG allocation procedure, removal of these three provisions in combination resulted in the same state-level allocations as when the state per pupil expenditure (SPPE) provision was removed individually. When the SPPE provision was removed from the formula, the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child increased in lower-spending states and decreased in higher-spending states.

When the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from $241 in Idaho to $684 in Vermont, a difference of $443 or 184 percent (table 7.A). This difference was smaller than the difference for the final allocations ($465 or 212 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, the largest increases were in Arkansas and Puerto Rico (both +$27), and the largest decreases were in Connecticut (-$73) and Maryland (-$71). Overall, 22 states had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 28 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

When the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, remote rural areas received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($350) than all other locales, which ranged from $240 for small suburban areas and $247 for large suburban areas to $319 for large cities (table 7.B; figure 7.10); this contrasted with the pattern for the final allocations and allocations with single provisions removed. The difference between the allocations for remote rural areas and small suburban areas was $110 or 46 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations ($189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, the largest increase was for remote towns (+$58), and the only decrease was for large cities (-$76).

Figure 7.10. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state per pupil expenditure (SPPE), hold harmless, and number weighting provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

When the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($357). School districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter ($201) and second lowest for the lowest poverty quarter ($205). Compared with the final allocations, when the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, there were increases in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter (+$5) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (+$1); in contrast, there were decreases for the second-lowest poverty quarter (-$12) and the lowest poverty quarter (-$4). When the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, the difference between the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter ($357) and the second-lowest poverty quarter ($201) was $156 or 78 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations ($143 or 68 percent).

When the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the largest districts within each poverty quarter did not consistently have higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts; for the final allocations, the largest districts did consistently have higher allocations than smaller districts. For example, the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter had a lower allocation ($328) than smaller districts in that quarter, which ranged from $364 in the smallest districts to $369 in the second-largest districts. The range ($41) between the districts with the highest and lowest allocations was smaller than the range for the final allocations ($118). Compared with the final allocations, the removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increase (+$63) for the second-smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-$92) for the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter. There were also decreases for the largest districts for the second-highest poverty quarter (-$57) and the second-lowest poverty quarter (-$68).

After removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions from the formula in combination, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) ($332), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of 300 to 599 ($296). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 ($267). The difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was $65, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations ($115). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the SPPE, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increase (+$48) for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 and the largest decrease (-$45) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts).

Top

Removal of State Minimum, Hold Harmless, and Number Weighting

Removal of multiple provisions produced patterns that differed from those for the final allocations or allocations with single provisions removed. When the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child increased slightly in many states and decreased in state minimum states. Due to the EFIG allocation procedure, removal of the hold harmless and number weighting provisions had no impact on the state-level allocations; however, removing these two provisions in combination with the state minimum provision produced the same state-level results as when the state minimum provision was removed individually.

Removal of the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions from the formula in combination had an impact of less than $5 per formula-eligible child for the majority of states, but it reduced the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child by more than $100 in 6 of the 10 states that received the state minimum allocation (table 7.A). For example, Vermont’s EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child decreased by $352, North Dakota’s decreased by $348, Wyoming’s decreased by $296, South Dakota’s decreased by $187, New Hampshire’s decreased by $176, and Alaska’s decreased by $161. Overall, the states ranged from $221 in Idaho to $405 in the District of Columbia, a difference of $184 or 83 percent. This difference was the same as the difference when the state minimum provision was removed and smaller than the difference for the final allocations ($465 or 212 percent). Overall, 9 states and the District of Columbia had decreases in their allocations compared with the final allocations, while 41 states and Puerto Rico had no changes or increases.

Similar to the final allocations and allocations with other provisions removed, when the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, large cities received a higher EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($330) than all other locales, which ranged from $241 for small suburban areas and $247 for large suburban areas to $315 for remote rural areas (table 7.B; figure 7.11). The difference between the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for large cities and small suburban areas was $89 or 37 percent, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations ($189 or 91 percent). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, the largest increases were for distant towns and fringe towns (both +$50), and the only decrease was for large cities (-$65).

Figure 7.11. Title I, Part A Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) final allocation per formula-eligible child and allocation with state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions removed, by school district characteristics: 2015

When the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the highest poverty quarter received the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($361). Districts with lower poverty rates had lower allocations. For example, the allocation was lowest for the second-lowest poverty quarter ($199) and second lowest for the lowest poverty quarter ($211). Compared with the final allocations, when the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, there were increases in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter (+$9) and for the lowest poverty quarter (+$2); in contrast, there were decreases for the second-lowest poverty quarter (-$15) and the second-highest poverty quarter (-$5). When the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed, the difference between the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child for the highest poverty quarter ($361) and the second-lowest poverty quarter ($199) was $162 or 82 percent, which was larger than the difference for the final allocations ($143 or 68 percent).

When the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions were removed from the formula in combination, the largest districts within each poverty quarter did not consistently have higher EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child than smaller districts; for the final allocations, the largest districts did consistently have higher allocations than smaller districts. Within the highest poverty quarter, the second-largest districts had an EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child of $375, compared with an allocation of $344 for the largest districts and an allocation of $352 for the smallest districts (a range of $31 or 9 percent). This range ($31) between the districts with the highest and lowest allocations was smaller than the range for the final allocations ($118). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increase (+$69) in the EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child for the second-smallest districts in the highest poverty quarter and the largest decrease (-$78) for the largest districts in the second-lowest poverty quarter. There were also relatively large decreases for the largest districts in the lowest poverty quarter (-$54) and the highest poverty quarter (-$76).

After removal of the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions from the formula in combination, the highest EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) ($293), and the second-highest allocation was for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts) ($292). The lowest allocation was for districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 ($270). The difference in the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child between the district population sizes with the highest and lowest allocations was $23, which was smaller than the difference for the final allocations ($115). Compared with the final allocations, removal of the state minimum, hold harmless, and number weighting provisions resulted in the largest increase (+$49) for districts with a population of 2,500 to 4,999 and the largest decrease (-$45) for districts with a population of 25,000 or more. The second-largest decrease was for districts with a population of less than 300 (-$41).

Top

Cost Adjustment Using the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI)

Applying the American Community Survey-Comparable Wage Index (ACS-CWI) increased the relative value of the EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child in low-cost areas and affected the differences between allocations using the various formula alternatives. When adjusted by the ACS-CWI, the EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from $221 in California to $798 in Vermont (a difference of $577) (table 7.AA). This difference was larger than the difference without the cost adjustment ($465). This increase in the difference between the highest and lowest EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child when applying the ACS-CWI was also observed when various provisions were removed. For example, the cost-adjusted allocations when the SPPE provision was removed ranged from $243 in California to $798 in Vermont (a difference of $555); without the cost adjustment, the difference was $443.

When the EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child were cost adjusted, large cities ($383) and remote rural areas ($382) still had the highest allocations, but the difference between the two locales decreased from $86 to $1 due to the relatively low cost of living in rural areas (table 7.BB). In addition, there were some circumstances where the removal of a single provision resulted in remote rural areas having the highest cost-adjusted allocation. For example, when the number weighting provision was removed, remote rural areas ($407) had the highest cost-adjusted EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child and large cities ($368) had the second-highest cost-adjusted allocation; large suburban areas had the lowest cost-adjusted allocation ($244).

Since many of the small school districts were in low-cost areas, their EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child were higher after applying the ACS-CWI. For example, the cost-adjusted EFIG final allocations per formula-eligible child ranged from $245 for districts with a 5- to 17-year-old population of 5,000 to 9,999 to $402 for districts with a population of less than 300 (the smallest districts). Removing only the hold harmless provision resulted in districts with a population of 25,000 or more (the largest districts) receiving the highest cost-adjusted EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child ($342), while districts with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 received the lowest cost-adjusted allocation ($243). In all other formula alternatives, applying the ACS-CWI resulted in the smallest districts having the highest EFIG allocations per formula-eligible child.

The cost-adjusted EFIG final allocation per formula-eligible child continued to be highest for the largest districts in the highest poverty quarter ($394) and lowest for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter ($166), but the difference between the highest and lowest cost-adjusted allocations was smaller than the difference for the unadjusted allocations ($258). When only the formula-eligibility criteria were considered, the highest cost-adjusted EFIG allocation per formula-eligible child was for the second-largest districts in the highest poverty quarter ($445), and the lowest cost-adjusted allocation continued to be for the second-smallest districts in the lowest poverty quarter ($134).

Top