Introduction
This paper develops the idea that the goal of educational adequacy, that is, high minimum educational outcomes for the disadvantaged is constrained by lack of a strong knowledge base and that a well- formulated research agenda can make an important contribution to policy.Currently, school finance is subject to conflicting and confusing pressures. On one hand, improved educational outcomes have probably never been so highly valued. The link between successful schooling and economic prosperity for both the individual and society is widely accepted (Gamoran 1994; National Education Association 1995). On the other hand, the link between educational outcomes and educational reform and investments is widely doubted (Hanushek 1991), and resources for education and all other public spending are becoming more limited (Gold 1995). Education for the disadvantaged raises these concerns in a particularly acute way. Poor children make up the bulk of students whose educational outcomes are seriously below economically functional minimums (Berne 1994b; Levin 1991); and remedial education is the target of especially strong skepticism and political resistance (Goertz 1983; Herrnstein and Murray 1994).
Under these circumstances, in which an emphasis on outcomes and skepticism about costs exists, it is natural that strains are developing in the traditional goal of equity in school finance (Clune 1994b). Equity guarantees inputs regardless of outcomes at a time when social pressures are moving in the opposite direction, toward outcomes which are guaranteed and costs which are contingent. This paper responds positively to the social environment by trying to develop a research agenda which has the capacity to clarify the relationship between educational investments, educational practice, and educational outcomes for the disadvantaged. The fundamental goal is cost-effectiveness, or productivity (Clune 1995c). As a later section will argue, once society (including the courts) becomes satisfied with a vision of how high minimum educational outcomes can be produced at minimum cost within an affordable budget, any necessary affordable amounts of additional funding will probably be forthcoming. More importantly, the proper direction for educational reform will be clarified as we learn about productive modifications of existing systems of educational governance and finance.
To show the importance of research, this paper must demonstrate both the promise and incompleteness of the existing knowledge base. The organization of the paper will outline the empirical "argument" for adequacy, including the building blocks of a policy-relevant agenda, showing within each element the importance of the topic, the problem for research, and the suggested agenda for further research. Accordingly, each section which follows addresses a distinct area of research important to a better understanding of the issue of educational adequacy.
The definition and level of minimum educational outcomes
As if the problems of actually achieving it were not difficult enough, adequacy also confronts a number of serious, threshold problems of definition and political acceptability (Chambers and Parrish 1983). "Adequate" means sufficient for some outcome. However, the definition of the target outcomes and the availability of possible means to the outcomes are both socially controversial and subject to competing demands for other private and social goods. What package of social outcomes, such as economic productivity and good citizenship, is to be produced by the schools? And, at what levels are these outcomes to be achieved- through what kind, duration, and intensity of schooling, and at what permissible cost? Further compounding the complexity is the question of what value to place on equality. Societies have aggregate "taste" for equality (or distaste for inequality, or at least human misery), but questions of equality are even more obviously controversial and contingent upon available wealth.
Problems of defining adequacy might seem to justify research on the social costs and benefits of education for the disadvantaged. Henry Levin, for example, developed a case for compensatory spending based on both the benefits of good education and the social costs of poor education (1991). This and other arguments about returns to education are certainly relevant, but the social controversy surrounding the issue makes them necessarily inconclusive (e.g., how certain are we that compensatory spending in the present will reduce crime costs in the future, and how willing are today's taxpayers to make such an investment?).
Fortunately, defining adequacy is one of those rare problems which is practically manageable in spite of being conceptually difficult. The key is distinguishing between three different issues: the basic definition of competence, the resources, and the details of measurement. While the level of required competence is conceptually and politically difficult, society does regularly resolve it. Many political and social processes operate to define minimum functional skills in society, including the official acts of legislative bodies in setting standards and the demands of the business community for skilled workers. Standard setting for education is, in fact, both fundamental and historically well established. The gradual spread of mass education through successively higher levels of schooling, culminating in universal high school education, is one historical example (Chambers and Parrish 1983). Providing high school education for all those who would otherwise not obtain it is considerably more expensive than the incremental cost of raising minimum scores, whatever that cost might be. Indeed, public education itself is based on a notion of adequacy. The combination of courts recognizing adequacy as one of the purposes of public education, and state legislatures defining minimum functional levels of achievement, is probably the main example of how social processes do, in fact, resolve the indeterminate conceptual difficulties. It is noteworthy that mainstream institutions have a strong incentive for accuracy in defining adequacy and no obvious political bias. Commercial enterprises, for example, need workers with a minimum of general skills, but do not want to pay for more skills than are necessary.
The second question about adequacy is that of available resources. Here, one might think there is an obvious political problem, perhaps even an impasse, over redistribution of wealth. Wealthier taxpayers resist transfer payments to the poor (Goertz 1983), and protection of minority interests blocked in the legislative process is one of the classic functions of courts (Clune 1984). Yet school finance reform has a much broader base than that of some minority interests. Public finance suggests that it is rational for society to pay for the external benefits of education, and the political process seems to behave in approximately that fashion. Educational spending has grown faster than the cost of living for many decades (Odden and Clune 1995a) and maintains its relative position even in the midst of calls for austerity. All educational spending involves a transfer from taxpayers to those being educated. There are very few who call for the outright repeal of educational subsidies or even the rollback of universal high school education. Compensatory aid for the poor is enacted by legislatures, even in the absence of court mandates. Litigation over school finance frequently involves courts siding with a substantial minority of aggrieved districts (Alexander 1991; Grossman 1995, forthcoming). It seems likely then, that a substantial amount of extra money could be found for adequacy, even ignoring the fact that adequacy produces substantial savings such as reductions in retentions in grade and special education (Barnett 1995), and could be financed by relatively small adjustments in existing funding. Thus, money probably can be found to support adequacy, if the educational system can be persuasive in removing doubts about the weak link between increased spending and better outcomes (the very topic of this paper).
The third set of issues about defining adequacy concerns how to measure it. Courts frequently develop long lists of desirable outcomes for education (Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 s.w. Ken. 2d 186, 212-13 [1989]; Underwood 1995, forthcoming). A lively debate presently exists about the importance of "basic skills" versus "higher order thinking" for disadvantaged children (Commission on Chapter 1 1992). Recently developed state-of-the-art tests in Kentucky and California have resulted in many students failing to achieve a "proficient" score (Kirst et al. 1995). The impression left by such debates is that the precise operational definition of adequacy is hopelessly confused. Inevitably there are many complex issues to be resolved in actually developing a test of student achievement (Trimble and Forsaith 1995, forthcoming).
I am skeptical about the extent of the real disagreement, however. As with defining adequacy and resources, there is probably more theoretical than practical confusion. A simple working definition of adequacy includes basic proficiency in literacy, numeracy, and problem solving; completion of a standard high school education; and perhaps eligibility for higher education. The question, then, is how much any specific measurement of adequacy really departs from this conceptual core. A reasonable hypothesis is that various tests are highly correlated, various standards define approximately the same level of performance, and all standards assume continued attendance and progress through the years of schooling. For example, "high minimum achievement" probably is very close to a different standard sometimes recommended: average achievement among disadvantaged children equal to the average of the population as a whole. The higher levels of proficiency demanded by avant-garde tests probably should be regarded as an effort to change educational content and raise standards for the future.
Research which examines the degree of conformity among various standards of adequacy in the United States might help establish the existence of social consensus over adequacy and dispel confusion over specific standards. Clearly, policymakers could benefit from a better perspective on the differences and similarities among various operational definitions. It would be useful to know the fiscal status of poor children in terms of availability of resources. How much compensatory aid is already available from what sources? How do such children stand relative to others in the state and in the country when this aid is added to the base funding of the schools attended by poor children? Such data could begin to provide a view of the spending gap for adequate compensatory funding. Fiscal data could then be added to the data base on high poverty schools as suggested below.
The extent and distribution of inadequate educational outcomes and the overlapping populations of special needs children
Part of the case for previous reform movements aimed at meeting special student needs was an empirical demonstration of the extent and distribution of the exclusion from educational opportunity (Clune and Van Pelt 1985). Available data on high-poverty schools suggest a remarkable picture of low outcomes, inadequate inputs, and overlap with minority status (Berne 1994a; Natriello 1994). The empirical question is whether, for practical purposes, the problem of educational adequacy is a problem of high-poverty schools. Existing data suggest that perhaps 90 percent of the aggregate subminimal outcomes in the United States are located in perhaps 10 percent of the schools. This is the familiar issue of concentration vs. diffusion under Chapter 1- the great majority of elementary schools get some Chapter 1 money (American Institutes for Research 1993). Further, even including compensatory aid, such schools are often funded at or below the average for the state, and have many obvious deficiencies in standard inputs, especially lack of a qualified and stable teaching staff (Berne 1994b; Kozol 1991). But, as with the earlier reform movements, existing data have been developed for litigation or other special purposes and are available only for certain states and cities. Development of a national database comparing high-poverty schools to other schools on multiple dimensions would be an important contribution.
A second important issue is the extent of overlap of various categories of special needs children within the disadvantaged category. On one hand, linguistic limitations and handicapping conditions do not represent the same need as poverty, and the conditions may be cumulative. On the other hand, there is some overlap. Nominally different programs may be triggered by the same set of educational indicators (e.g., low test scores); and the same remedy may be appropriate for different conditions (see Madden, Slavin, Karweit, Dolan and Wasik [1991] on using special education teachers for acceleration of reading for all students). The issue of overlap has both financial and pedagogical consequences- the amount of aid required and the kind of appropriate educational interventions.
The sheer feasibility of substantially raising minimum performance
Much confusion still exists about whether it is possible to reliably raise the achievement of disadvantaged children up to high minimum performance, within any reasonable range of resources. The Bell Curve (Herrnstein and Murray 1994) takes the position that remedial education produces small, uncertain gains with ordinary resources and that only adoption of infants by high SES families produces a big effect. Ralph and colleagues maintain that the distribution of achievement is remarkably stable and little influenced by quality of schooling. For example, children in the bottom ranges of achievement do not catch up to the 4th grade performance of their higher achieving classmates until practically the end of schooling (Ralph, Keller, and Crouse 1994). On the other hand, Slavin and his colleagues (1994) claim to be able to raise the reading achievement of elementary students to grade level (average) "whenever and wherever we choose." There is also some evidence that the lower achievement of disadvantaged 12th graders actually represents nothing more than the accumulation of small annual increments of a magnitude which could be remedied by year long schooling (Gamoran in press). Additionally, some research on production functions and cost analysis finds substantial effects from feasible increases in resources (Clune 1995b; Duncombe, Ruggeriero, and Yinger 1995; Ferguson and Ladd 1995).
One persistent source of confusion in such research is the difference between reporting results in terms of norm or criterion references. Even a small yearly gain in standard deviations or percentiles may represent a significant portion of the goal of high minimum performance. Failure to focus on lower achieving students is another problem. Traditional quantitative research which examines the data on disadvantaged children in terms of criterion-referenced minimum achievement standards might help clarify the picture.
Another obviously important source of research is evaluation of accelerated schools (in the generic sense which includes all schools with an accelerative mission). The theoretical ideal would be to have accelerated schools cooperate in some kind of quasi- experimental design, although much could be learned from readily available data which is simply not reported. Accelerated schools are designed to operate on a tight budget and often lack the resources needed for a thorough evaluation. Slavin's "success for all" schools (Madden et al 1991) are an exception in providing longitudinal data on student achievement. Even these schools, however, fail to provide the most minimal data on costs (Barnett 1995). While feasibility might be addressed simply by longitudinal achievement data, cost is also of great importance because of the political relevance of cost-effectiveness. Educational and implementation processes are additional facets of accelerated school networks which should be investigated under the general heading of feasibility, addressed below. Thus, funding and management of an evaluation data base for a group of accelerated schools would seem to be well worth the investment. After all, the schools themselves are already expending much higher levels of resources necessary to programs which produces the effects.
Geographic mobility, irregular attendance and the problem of partial and shared responsibility among schools
Geographic mobility of students attending urban schools is a problem for adequacy in several ways. It is a serious challenge to the model of school accountability and school improvement because schools cannot be held responsible for the full annual achievement of students who spend a shorter time in the school (Ferguson and Ladd 1995). Behind accountability lie problems of enrollment management and organization of service delivery. Student mobility can be reduced to an unknown extent by administration (e.g., altering enrollment zones and providing transportation) and by encouraging stability through the quality of education at particular schools. In the latter case, mobility is considered an "endogenous" problem of school quality (Barnett 1995). To the extent that changes in attendance cannot or should not be avoided, the question is how to organize the delivery of educational services (e.g., how to coordinate programs under conditions of shared responsibility). Mobility seems to affect student achievement, that of both the transferring students and the other students (Ferguson and Ladd 1995). The delivery system, however, is fundamentally blind to mobility and organizing instruction based on an assumption of continuous instruction in one place. Mobility also may have strongly differential effects on different kinds of high poverty schools, creating a system of unequal, stratified responsibility in urban school systems. Magnet schools, for example, not only attract the most qualified students, but are able to control attendance in advance through the process of selection. Neighborhood schools, on the other hand, are stripped of the most able students and must bear the brunt of all of the problems of student mobility, including late registration and high annual turnover (Moore 1990). Irregular attendance is both an additional and compounding factor for schools' responsibility.
Because mobility may be an important, unmeasured aspect of educational need, it is important that we obtain more and better data on the extent and kind of mobility and attendance in the variety of high poverty schools. Where possible, the effect of mobility on achievement should also be analyzed.
The educational technologies of accelerated education
Accelerated education is the ultimate goal of educational adequacy (Levin 1988). If poor children could learn the same material as other children at the same pace, they would not be educationally disadvantaged. A longitudinal study of students in Chicago found that only four percent graduated with a reading level above the national average. Two key educational outcomes where the students lagged behind were devastatingly significant in relation to acceleration: graduation from high school, and reading as a vital measure of student achievement (Moore 1990).
In one sense, we have known the basic elements of successful accelerated education for some time: an accelerated curriculum (or, more accurately, not a retarded curriculum), high expectations for student learning, a positive school climate (for both students and staff), and a safe and orderly environment (Purkey and Smith 1983). In another sense, however, these are intermediate outcomes, or indicators, of a successful educational process, which are not self- explanatory about how such desirable characteristics are produced. It is obvious that an accelerated curriculum is a key part of accelerated education, but it is extremely unlikely that accelerated education can be produced just by changing the content of courses and textbooks. Appropriately tailored subject matter, skills of the teachers, and the minds of the students must converge around a complete learning process which is rare in high poverty schools.
The central question, then, is what the staff of the school must do that is different. Research has also established various answers to this question: staff development to raise expectations and acquire new teaching skills, extra staff time spent assisting students with learning problems, and outreach to the families and caretakers. (See Barnett [1995] for an overview of three approaches to accelerated education.) The key gap in our knowledge concerns how these elements can be combined, the conditions under which various combinations are successful, and, ultimately, the feasibility and cost of various approaches. For example, if the staff development through outside consultants, alone, is enough for the typical high poverty school, the cost would be relatively minor (Barnett 1995). But if that model is successful in a small percentage of schools, additional, more expensive changes may be also required in the typical school. These changes might include preschool, extra staff for tutoring, higher salaries for more skilled teachers, and a higher budget for school safety and security. Even the best designed program, supported at the highest resource level, may fail where conditions are most unfavorable. As a minor example, high salaries will not attract and maintain qualified teachers if personnel policies are unacceptable (Murnane et al. 1991).
Knowledge combining educational practice, cost, outcomes, and feasibility is difficult to obtain, but greater success is possible. The main challenge is that conditions of success in a limited number of schools may be difficult to measure and replicate. For example, low cost models may flourish in schools where there are unusual leaders and teachers, and initial success may have a powerful impact over time on the quality of both staff and students. Since we cannot know what works on a broad scale until we try it, the most logical approach would seem to be a program of phased experimentation in which various programs are evaluated with various levels of resources (Clune 1994a, 1995b). It seems strange that a society so preoccupied with the importance of educational adequacy and cost should spend so little on educational experiments, which are relatively inexpensive compared to any kind of broad scale increase in resources. Perhaps we are only now reaching the point where the central questions are becoming clear.
Short of a program of organized experiments, we still could gather much better data about current interventions. This paper has already recommended that better data be obtained on the outcomes and cost of successful accelerated schools. This section adds the element of educational process, or teaching technology. We need a fine-grained understanding of what staff and students do differently in order to begin understanding the conditions under which such desirable behaviors can flourish. Careful investigations of schools adopting models of accelerated education are, therefore, a promising direction for research.
The extra costs of accelerated education
The extra costs of accelerated education are currently the subject of a wide divergence of views. A high estimate was made in Abbott v. Burke (119 N.J. 287; 575 A. 2d 359, 400 [1990]), the New Jersey case which ordered spending in special needs districts be set equal to resource-rich suburban districts, with an added supplement for remedial education. The New Jersey Court reasoned that a good estimate of costs of adequacy is the resources available to the state's most successful students, e.g., those with the best outcomes. An estimate of the same magnitude was derived through cost analysis by Duncombe, Ruggeriero, and Yinger (1995) resulting in at least an additional $3,800 per pupil in New York State. A low estimate was derived by Barnett who synthesized cost-effectiveness research on three programs of accelerated education and concluded that the extra costs amounted to between $100 and $1,000 per pupil per year, an amount easily covered by existing revenues (Barnett 1995). Barnett also concludes, however, there is no data on the base funding of these programs, their success rate, or the extent to which the interventions can be generalized. The most reasonable explanation of Barnett's results is the successful interventions represent the low-cost, high-skill end of a production frontier (Clune 1995b), achieved in certain schools and not in others by reformers who assume they must operate within existing levels of resources (Clune 1995b). For this reason, I did not modify my earlier guess of the full range of costs- between $2,000 and $5,000 per pupil per year. On the other hand, we cannot reach any firm conclusions without more data, and there is certainly no reason to pay more than is necessary.
A large part of the problem in estimating costs is the failure to specify the various components of costs and gather appropriate data. Adequacy-based funding is thought to involve three major components: base funding, student needs, and extra costs for standard inputs (Chambers and Parrish 1983). The discussion begins with student needs, another name for accelerated education, but add the element of "slack" in the existing system. The extra costs of accelerated instruction actually consist of the total costs minus any savings which can be garnered from the typical preexisting educational program. As discussed in the previous section, the costs of accelerated education depend on the combination of inputs effective in various contexts. Professional development alone tends to be inexpensive. Extra staff, higher pay for teachers, and new levels of education such as preschool are more expensive (but also seemingly affordable).
The next question is how much "slack" is available in existing schools to pay for additional costs. Under one view, there is considerable slack, for example, in the following: high expectations and a challenging curriculum replacing low expectations for learning and dumbed-down curriculum; coordinated vs. uncoordinated learning; active time vs. down time; and efficient vs. inefficient instructional methods. These are all possible with relatively minor expenses for professional development. There is also a question about wasted administrative time. Under Levin's model, all faculty meetings are used for planning and implementing accelerated education. This seems to assume that large parts of previous faculty meetings were unnecessary. Another possible area of slack is the conversion of existing positions. One study found that extra positions could be made available by efficient management of class size (Miles 1994). Some accelerated schools appear to put more teachers in the classroom (Darling-Hammond 1995, forthcoming). Finally, accelerated schools may consolidate programs and positions aimed at meeting a variety of special needs. Slavin's schools virtually eliminate special education and retention in grade, focusing almost all remedial resources on catching up in reading, mathematics, etc. (Barnett 1995). Generally, claims of available slack are made somewhat more plausible because programs which focus on specific learning goals have incentives and standards for marshalling resources which are lacking in organizations with multiple, fragmented goals. On the other hand, the opposite view of a narrow focus is the possibility that other unmeasured goals have been sacrificed.
What is the impact of Slavin's program on the achievement of handicapped students who previously may have received more instructional resources (Levin 1994)? Teachers commonly claim that almost any strongly evaluated program with a single focus will cause them to sacrifice important parts of their teaching. For example, evaluation based on mathematics scores may overlook the importance of fine arts in a particular community. The possible distorting effects of accountability are a vexing issue, but the risk may be tolerable as long as in the aggregate and in important sub-groups students perform well on a broad range of skills considered most important by society. One of the most enduring findings of education research is that programs score higher against measures of goals at which they are aimed than on generally applicable tests (Walker and Shaffarszick 1974). This finding seems better interpreted as an endorsement of organizational focus than as an assumption that all organizations must optimize some set of measured and unmeasured goals.
The assumed base level of spending is a somewhat confusing and complex issue under an adequacy-based approach calculated in terms of incremental costs. Assuming that extra costs are $2,000 per pupil, the question is: $2,000 per pupil added to what? The normal starting place is horizontal equity, an assumed base of spending guaranteed for every district and student in the state in the form of spending per pupil or in educational vouchers. Conceptually, this base level of funding should correspond to an adequately financed program for a school which has no extra costs from expensive inputs or special needs- in effect, it is the least-cost school in the state (Duncombe, Ruggeriero, and Yinger 1995). Odden and Clune (1995b) suggest the 90th percentile of rural spending as a rough approximation of such a school, but there are alternative methods. The Alabama litigation, for example, used various official minimum standards for inputs to establish the cost of a base program (Hershkoff, Cohen, and Morgan 1995). Guaranteeing a reasonable base to high-poverty schools is much more important than the exact method of calculation. Many high poverty schools are located in resource-constrained school districts. This means that any available compensatory aid must be used to support the basic program rather than provide accelerated education.
The final component of adequacy financing is extra costs for standard inputs (Chambers and Parrish 1983). High poverty schools seem to be burdened with five types of high input costs: preschool and Kindergarten, qualified teacher salaries, building and maintenance, school safety, and social services. Early childhood education is assumed to be especially important and beneficial for disadvantaged children (Barnett 1995); and Slavin's programs guarantee some amount of this input (Madden et al. 1991). Teacher salaries must be higher in less desirable educational settings (Chambers 1981; National Education Association 1995; Reschovsky and Wiseman 1995). As for capital expenses, a common finding of the implementation of school finance reform is that poor schools frequently draw on instructional revenues to pay for deferred costs of building and maintenance (Firestone et al. 1994; Picus and Hertert 1993). School safety is widely considered an important aspect of effective schools (Purkey and Smith 1983), but less is known about how to estimate costs. Social services are the most confusing of the categories because they are potentially important in the case of poor children and may be organized separately (despite the movement toward collaboration and school-linked services, and are financed by different budgets [Kirst 1994; Zigler and Stevenson 1994]).
One of the most confusing issues in adequacy-based funding is how to measure and do research on these various categories of costs. Cost analysis attempts to reflect the broadest range of costs, including teacher salaries. However, the sample used may not be representative of the most needy schools, and capital expenditures usually are not included (Clune 1995b; Duncombe, Ruggeriero, and Yinger 1995). At the other extreme, cost-effectiveness analysis of accelerated programs often does not take into account either the base program or costly inputs. These are both large categories relative to extra instructional spending designed to meet student needs. It would, therefore, be helpful if future research could begin to triangulate cost estimates drawn from different assumptions and included different components of cost. Studies of accelerated schools could gather better data on base funding and input costs in addition to the marginal cost of meeting student needs. Cost analysis might focus on high-poverty schools and include capital spending. Research on labor markets for teachers might attempt to calibrate costs relative to qualifications shown by research to be important to the achievement of disadvantaged students. Capital costs may benefit from a separate analysis based on rational standards of a physical plant which is minimally acceptable for adequate instruction of the type required for accelerated education. Such analysis of capital costs should take into consideration any backlog of needs and the effects of changes in student population (e.g., rapid growth).
The structure of state aid under an adequacy theory
The basic flaws of existing educational funding formulas, from the perspective of educational adequacy, are quite simple and twofold: failure to provide either guaranteed base funding or fully cover extra costs of inputs and special needs. At a deeper level, these flaws are caused by starkly different assumptions of adequacy and equity approaches to state aid (Reschovsky and Wiseman 1995). Most state aid formulas are built around inter-district equity, spend more money on horizontal equity than special needs or extra costs, and include a generous element of local taxing discretion. These formulas may or may not be supported by a fair system of matching grants from the state (guaranteed tax base). Previously, I have recommended that the special needs part of the formula be fully funded and put on top of a strong statewide system of horizontal equity. For example, one might think of a foundation level at the 90th percentile of rural spending, a guaranteed tax base above that level, categorical aid for instructional needs, and special adjustments for extra costs (Clune 1995a, forthcoming).
Such an approach of supplemented equity would certainly represent an improvement for many high poverty schools (see American Institutes for Research 1993: how the lowest levels of compensatory aid under Chapter 1 often went to the poorest districts). However, there remain some serious problems. The generous guarantee of horizontal equity in the form of the high foundation program causes competition for scarce funds between horizontal equity and special needs. Local taxing discretion is likely to result in inadequately addressing the special needs of some of the state's neediest students. An alternative is to forthrightly recognize the different assumptions of the two systems and design a separate system of finance for high poverty schools (similar to what the court attempted in New Jersey but with more refined estimates). High-poverty schools could receive a high foundation grant, special categorical aid, and supplements for extra costs, all guaranteed by the state under a reasonable system of sharing state and local taxes. Such a distinct and severable approach to the funding of high poverty schools probably also represents a better fit with the special problems. These problems of governance and accountability, discussed below, arise from the attempt to create better incentives for actually adopting some form of accelerated education.
What kind of research is possible on school aid formulas? The most fruitful approach appears to be a set of simulations based on different assumptions of the costs of adequacy and the structure of state aid. The basic questions are the same for every study of school finance: total revenue, tax burden, and distributional consequences (how much would it cost, to which taxpayers, and how many schools would experience an increase or decrease in spending). While many simulations have been done of school aid formulas (Odden and Picus 1992), a different view would be produced by a rigorous analysis focused on the special needs of poor children. The question would be one of "opportunity cost" (Chambers and Parrish 1983)- what are the revenue and distributional consequences of full funding of adequate education while meeting the other needs in a cost-minimizing fashion. Of course, the normal assumption is exactly the opposite- meeting various competing needs and determining what is left over for the poor; and this tends to hold true even in the context of litigation aimed primarily at compensatory education (Goertz 1983). In such studies, it would be difficult to ignore the problem often discussed in school finance of inter-state differences in spending. Alabama clearly has lower costs than New York, but such costs are not proportionate to the full difference in wealth and spending. A suitable national policy on adequate funding (what Chapter 1 purports to be) would need to take into consideration inter-state differences in the level of base funding. Therefore, research on adequacy funding should include simulations of the effects of interstate adjustments.
Implementation- increasing the number of schools using cost-effective accelerated education
Suppose, then, we understand what accelerated education is, how much it will cost, and how funding is obtained. How does the policy system guarantee, or increase the odds, that the schools receiving the funds actually will adopt and successfully implement a version of accelerated education? Whatever the educational technology and cost, accelerated education involves adopting a set of new attitudes, teaching skills, and management practices. On one level, the greatest puzzle about accelerated education is why it is adopted by so few schools. Does the barrier to wider implementation consist of motivation or capacity, or both? A serious debate about this exists, somewhat paralleling the debate over costs. At one end of the spectrum, the transfer is seen as relatively easy, and can be implemented on a wide scale by a combination of state accountability, incentives, and professional development (Hanushek 1994). An intermediate position on implementation difficulty is that schools will need to join accelerated schools' networks and receive the intensive, targeted training available through those networks (Clune 1987; Slavin, Madden, and Dolan 1994). A third view is that we have barely touched the problem of implementation, because existing successful schools are probably connoisseurs of improvement (Elmore 1995, forthcoming). Most schools, under this view, present serious problems of inertia and resistance to wholesale improvement. These are problems which are presently little understood, either in their dimensions or remedies.
Lack of data is one problem in answering the questions about implementation. Implementation of accelerated education is even less studied than evaluation of costs and outcomes. The establishment and survival of demonstrations and experiments is an understood part of published literature. Little thought is directed to the problematic nature of how such innovations are disseminated, adopted, and transferred. More studies of propagation, adoption, and training within accelerated school networks are needed. Schools which successfully adopt a change should be compared with those where the effort fails. Another important comparison is that of schools under strong pressure and incentives to improve from state and local accountability systems (as opposed to networks). Is improvement largely random under the different systems? Is there a residue of schools resistant to any stimulus, and what is known about how to reform such schools? For example, how does the remedy of closing failing schools work?
Implementation also involves some costs beyond professional training in the target school. Member schools of the Success for All network have been providing a trained teacher/manager to other schools for a year, free of charge. To the extent that propagation does involve a subsidy, it is necessary to understand the best method of financing this cost for the future.
Governance- the blend of accountability variety and decentralization necessary for adequate education
Whatever the proper stimulus for reform, a question arises about the range of governance structures capable of tolerating and encouraging such reforms. Consideration of this range of structures will again result in serious debate. In one sense, the problem is the familiar tension between top-down and bottom-up reform. Research on implementation will probably clarify that not much will happen without a stimulus to change. It seems equally clear, however, that there are at least several kinds of accelerated education, each requiring a high degree of adaptation and flexibility. The question, then, is what kind of sensitive governance structure is capable of exerting strong pressure without stifling schools or pushing them in the wrong direction.
Some authorities seem to believe that accelerated education can occur under most kinds of governance systems. It can be viewed as traditional education done more effectively and efficiently and, therefore, presents no problem for management or unions (this is my impression from talking with Henry Levin). I took the position earlier that strong instructional guidance from central government was an unlikely match (Clune 1987), but arguments for the power of coherent policy have not been proven wrong (Smith and O'Day 1991). The power of simple incentive systems, such as rewards for outcomes or participation in networks, deserve consideration because of their relatively non-intrusive character (Hanushek 1994). Some people regard school districts, especially large urban districts, as a serious obstacle (Darling-Hammond 1995, forthcoming) while others think the relationship varies according to local context (Carnoy et al. 1994). Under one view, many large districts are the enemies of school improvement, not only stifling them with unnecessary regulations, but regarding their success as a threat. This view probably favors the largest possible amount of site management but, additionally, does not explain the source of pressure and incentives to encourage schools to change. If it is necessary that the schools join a network, what agency will certify the network: what are the incentives; and how shall good faith participation be evaluated? In an earlier article, I suggested that networks perform technical assistance and provide simple data for evaluation, leaving only ultimate evaluation to a government agency (Clune 1987). On the basis of empirical evidence, some researchers are skeptical about the capacity of any government agency to assess when intervention is required and to intervene in an appropriate manner (Firestone and Nagle 1995; Hess 1994). The deregulation and community of purpose attributed to radical decentralization, e.g., choice and charters, have been recommended as possible sources of school improvement, or at least of freedom from burdensome regulations; and these claims should be seriously evaluated.
The research which seems most appropriate to these questions would be studies of rapidly improving and other schools in both network and incentive systems under various conditions of guidance, restriction, and assistance from central government.
Choice and decentralization- the reality of a low cost, low change alternative
In a political sense, choice and decentralization seem to have a quicker start than sustained school improvement, perhaps because they are easier do. Despite earlier claims (Chubb 1990; Chubb and Moe 1990), the evidence that decentralization will produce major changes in achievement seems weak, both empirically and theoretically (Clune 1990; Hoxby 1995; Witte et al. 1994). Indeed, the rationale of choice advocates may be changing from instrumental arguments about effectiveness to value arguments about freedom of choice and association. But choice does offer at least one important option in the debate over adequacy: the possibility of a low cost, low change alternative. The Milwaukee experiment did not increase scores, but it did not decrease them either, and the voucher schools cost much less than the public schools. Again, the generalization of modest cost is subject to vehement debate. Initially, low cost seems based on excess capacity in a limited number of existing private schools and a secondary labor market for teachers. It is doubtful that drastic reductions in teacher qualifications resulting from massive cuts in teacher salaries are politically feasible, or will have a beneficial impact on student achievement.
Nevertheless, these are all empirical questions, and the political appeal of choice makes it well worth watching. From the perspective of adequacy, we need to understand effect of large scale decentralization change on education for poor children. A reasonable set of questions would include the effects on: private investment; public investment; costs (including transportation and regulation, [Levin 1990]); the labor market for teachers; student achievement; and stratification of students by race, class and achievement. One problem for such research is finding large scale demonstrations in the United States. Choice systems in this country tend to be small and incremental. Comparative studies involving many students, such as those conducted in Europe and South America, may be useful, especially with regard to some basic dynamics of student achievement, markets and public finance (Carnoy 1995).
A crosscutting look at the research questions and methodologies appropriate for studying educational adequacy
This section summarizes research questions discussed in this paper and comments on methodologies appropriate for answering them.
- Definition of educational adequacy and the political problem of available resources
- degree of conformity among minimum standards of achievement in the United States
- existing funding levels for poor students and the extent of the funding gap
- Demographics of educational need
- distribution of low educational outcomes in the U.S. and degree of correlation with high-poverty schools
- overlap and divergence of various categories of special needs: poor, handicapped, bilingual
- Feasibility of raising educational outcomes
- studies of data on poor children
- longitudinal outcome data from accelerated schools
- Geographic mobility and irregular attendance
- studies of the extent and kind of mobility in high poverty schools and its impact on student achievement
- Educational technologies of accelerated education
- organized experiments of accelerated education involving different program approaches and costs
- studies of the teaching technologies of existing accelerated schools
- Extra costs of accelerated education
- parallel cost estimates from acceler- ated schools and quantitative analysis
- separate estimates of capital cost needs
- studies of the costs of qualified teachers in the labor market
- Structure of state aid under an adequacy theory
- simulations of two different aid formulas under different cost assumptions
- Implementation- increasing the number of schools using cost-effective accelerated education
- studies of attempts to implement new accelerated schools
- studies of school transformations under various incentive systems
- studies of the costs of school improvement networks
- Governance- the blend of accountability variety and decentralization necessary for adequate education
- studies of role of governance in rapidly improving and other schools under different kinds and degrees of educational governance (including decentralization)
- Educational decentralization as a low cost alternative
- studies of investment, cost and educational outcomes especially in large scale choice experiments
Several of generalizations can be made about the research methods appropriate to these questions. First, much of the agenda depends on gathering more data from existing accelerated schools. Accelerated education is not very common in U.S. education, so it is not surprising that the some of the most valuable data would come from demonstration sites. At the low end of the scale of research burden, it would be very helpful to have basic data on educational outcomes and costs. At a higher level of burden, we would like a much better understanding of teaching technology, implementation, and fine-grained aspects of costs. But obtaining systematic data from accelerated schools presents a problem. The schools have their own systems of evaluation and may not agree with externally developed standards. Data gathering is also intrusive and expensive. This suggests a rather intense need for some kind of cooperative agreement and, if possible, extra financing for research.
A second category of research involves a variety of potentially useful secondary data sources- the demographics of student need, achievement trends among the poor, geographical mobility, simulations of funding formulas, and the like. Some research has been done in all of these areas and will continue to be done. The problems for fashioning a true national agenda involve supporting and coordinating a more extensive and cohesive set of related studies. Such an effort might normally be organized by the government or a foundation; but some real progress might be possible through the voluntary cooperation of research scholars and interested government agencies, such as big city school districts.
A third category of research involves a study of change in schools operating under different systems of incentives and governance. This kind of research seems best suited to a large scale, longitudinal research project, such as a research center.
The fourth category of research involves implementation of large systems of educational choice. Such research also may need substantial funding but may occur in selected locations without any special effort because such systems are rarely implemented and are the subject of great scholarly and political interest. Input from the adequacy community into the design of the research might be valuable.
Conclusion: The cumulative effect of better information
The basic thesis of this paper has been that a comprehensive research effort can help establish the legitimacy of a program of educational adequacy and define its contours. Much fragmented research has been done on all of the research topics discussed. It is hoped that an orderly exposition of the full range of topics will generate enthusiasm for an effort which has a higher level of support and better coordination.
References
Alexander, K. 1991. "The Common School Ideal and the Limits of Legislative Authority: The Kentucky Case." Harvard Journal on Legislation 28(2): 341.
American Institutes for Research. 1993. Translating Dollars into Services: Chapter 1 Resources in the Context of State and Local Resources for Education. Palo Alto, CA.
Barnett, S. 1996. "Economics of School Reform: What Can We Learn from Three Promising Models." in Holding Schools Accountable: Performance-based Reform in Education. Ed. H.F. Ladd. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. pp. 299-326.
Berne, R. 1994a. "Educational Input and Outcome Inequities in New York State." Outcome Equity in Education. Ed. R. Berne and L. Picus. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press.
Berne, R. 1994b. "Program Equity for All Children: Meaningful Goal or Impossible Dream?" Educational Policy 8(4): 502-517.
Carnoy, M. July, 1995. "Is School Privatization the Answer? Data from the Experience of Other Countries Suggest Not." Education Week XIV(40): 52, 40.
Carnoy, M., J. Hannaway, M. Chun, S.J. Stein, and P.L. Wong. 1994. "Urban and Suburban School Districts: Are They Different Kinds of Educational Producers." Paper prepared for the Consortium for Policy Research in Education Policy Center, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, and presented at the American Educational Research Association annual conference.
Chambers, J.G. 1981. "The Hedonic Wage Technique as a Tool for Estimating the Costs of School Personnel: A Theoretical Exposition with Implications for Empirical Analysis." Journal of Education Finance 6(3): 330-354.
Chambers, J. G., and T.B. Parrish. March, 1983. Adequacy and Equity in State School Finance and Planning: A Resource Cost Model Approach. Stanford, CA: Institute for Research on Educational Finance and Governance, Stanford University.
Chubb, J.E. 1990. "Political Institutions and School Organization." Choice and Control in American Education. 1: 227-234. Ed. W.H. Clune and J.F. Witte. Philadelphia: Falmer Press.
Chubb, J.E., and T.M. Moe. 1990. Politics, Markets, and America's Schools. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Clune, W.H. 1984. "Courts and Legislatures as Arbitrators of Social Change (review of `Educational Policymaking and the Courts: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism')." Yale Law Journal 93(4): 763.
Clune, W.H. 1987. "Institutional Choice as a Theoretical Framework for Research on Educational Policy." Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 9(2): 117-132.
Clune, W.H. 1990. Introduction to Choice and Control in American Education. 2: 1-15. Ed. W.H. Clune and J.F. Witte. Philadelphia: Falmer Press.
Clune, W.H. 1994a. Introduction to "The Cost and Management of Program Adequacy: An Emerging Issue in Educational Policy and Finance." Educational Policy 8(4): 365-375.
Clune, W.H. 1994b. The Shift from Equity to Adequacy in School Finance. Educational Policy 8(4), 376-394.
Clune, W.H. 1995. "Accelerated Education as a Remedy for High Poverty Schools." University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 28(3): 655-680.
Clune, W.H. April, 1996. "Comments on Chapters Eight, Nine, and Ten." in Holding Schools Accountable: Performance-based Reform in Education. Ed. H.F. Ladd. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. pp. 357-367.
Clune, W.H. 1996. "Education Finance in the 21st Century: Adequacy and Efficiency." in Linking Education Finance and Performance: Selected Proceedings State Education Workshop. Washington, DC: National Education Association. pp. 53-55.
Clune, W.H., and M.H. Van Pelt. Summer, 1985. "A Political Method of Evaluating the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and the Several Gaps of Gap Analysis." Law and Contemporary Problems 48(1): 7-62.
Commission on Chapter 1. 1992. Making Schools Work for Children in Poverty. Washington, DC: American Association for Higher Education.
Darling-Hammond, L. 1996. "Restructuring Schools for High Performance." in Rewards and Reform: Creating Educational Incentives That Work. Ed. S. Fuhrman and J. O'Day. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. pp. 144-192.
Duncombe, W., J. Ruggeriero, and J. Yinger. 1996. "Alternative Approaches to Measuring the Cost of Education." in Holding Schools Accountable: Performance-based Reform in Education. Ed. H.F. Ladd. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. pp. 327-356.
Elmore, R.F. 1996. "Getting to Scale With Successful Educational Practices." in Rewards and Reform: Creating Educational Incentives That Work. Ed. S. Fuhrman and J. O'Day. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. pp. 294-329.
Ferguson, R.F., and H. Ladd. April, 1996. "How and Why Money Matters: An Analysis of Alabama Schools." in Holding Schools Accountable: Performance-based Reform in Education. Ed. H.F. Ladd. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. pp. 265-298.
Firestone, W.A., M.E. Goertz, B. Nagle, and M.F. Smelkinson. 1994. "Where Did the $800 Million Go? The First Year of New Jersey's Quality Education Act." Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 16(4): 359-373.
Firestone, W.A., and B. Nagle. 1995. "Differential Regulation: Clever Customization or Unequal Interference?" Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 17(1): 97-112.
Gamoran, A. 1996. "Effects of Schooling on Children and Families." in Family-School Links: How do They Affect Educational Outcomes? Ed. A. Booth and J. Dunn. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. pp. 107-114.
Gamoran, A. 1994. "The Impact of Academic Course Work on Labor Market Outcomes for Youth Who do not Attend College: A Research Review." Paper prepared for the National Assessment of Vocational Education.
Goertz, Margaret. Spring, 1993. "School Finance Reform in New Jersey: The Saga Continues." Journal of Education Finance 18(4): 346-365.
Goertz, M.E. Work on formula simulations.
Gold, Steven D. May, 1995. The Outlook for School Revenue in the Next Five Years (CPRE Research Report Series Report no. 34). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University, Consortium for Policy Research in Education.
Grossman, M. 1995. "Oklahoma School Finance Litigation: Shifting From Equity to Adequacy." University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 28(3): 521-557.
Hanushek, E.A. 1991. "When School Finance `Reform' May Not be Good Policy." Harvard Journal on Legislation 28(2): 423-456.
Hanushek, E.A. 1994. "A Jaundiced View of `Adequacy' in School Finance Reform." Educational Policy 8(4): 60-469.
Herrnstein, R.J., and C. Murray. 1994. The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life. p. 421. New York: The Free Press.
Hess, G.A., Jr. 1994. "Adequacy Rather than Equity: A New Solution or a Stalking Horse?" Educational Policy 8(4): 44-567.
Hoxby, C.M. 1996. "The Effects of Private School Vouchers on Schools and Students." in Holding Schools Accountable: Performance-Based Reform in Education. Ed. H.F. Ladd. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. pp. 177-208.
Kirst, M.W. 1994. "Equity for Children: Linking Education and Children's Services." Educational Policy 8(4): 583-590.
Kirst, M. et al. April, 1995. Conditions of Education in California: Excerpts from PACE Report on Assessment and Achievement. Network News and Views XIV(7): 29-47.
Kozol, J. 1991. Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools. New York: Crown.
Levin, H.M. September, 1988. Accelerated Schools for At-Risk Students. CPRE Research Report Series no. RR-010. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University, Center for Policy Research in Education.
Levin, H.M. 1990. "The Theory of Choice Applied to Education." Choice and Control in American Education. Ed. W.H. Clune and J.F. Witte. 1: 247-284. Philadelphia: Falmer Press.
Levin, H. 1991. "The Economics of Justice in Education." Spheres of Justice in American Schools, 1990 Yearbook of the American Education Finance Association. Ed. D. Verstegen and J. Ward. New York: Harper & Row. pp. 129-145.
Levin, H.M. 1994. "Little Things Mean a Lot." Educational Policy 8(4): 396-403.
Madden, N.A., R.E. Slavin, N.L. Karweit, L. Dolan, and B.A. Wasik. 1991. "Success for All." Phi Delta Kappan 72(8): 593-599.
Miles, K.H. 1994. "Finding Time for Improving Schools: A Case Study of Boston Public Schools." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New Orleans, LA.
Moore, D. 1990. "Voice and Choice in Chicago." Choice and Control in American Education. Ed. W.H. Clune and J.F. Witte. 2: 153-198. Philadelphia: Falmer Press.
Morgan, M.I., A.S. Cohen, and H. Hershkoff. 1995. "Establishing Education Program Inadequacy: The Alabama Example." University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 28(3): 559-598.
Murnane, R.J., J.D. Singer, J.B. Willett, J. Kemple, and R. Olsen. 1991. Who Will Teach? Policies that Matter. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
National Education Association. 1995. How Education Spending Matters to Economic Development. Washington, DC.
Natriello, G. 1994. "Four Perspectives on the Disparities Between the Educational Resources Available to Students in the Hartford Public Schools and Other Connecticut Communities." Unpublished paper available from author.
Odden, A., and W.H.Clune. 1995a. "Educational Productivity and Organizing for Higher Performance." Paper prepared for the Consortium for Policy Research in Education, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ. Draft.
Odden, A., and W.H. Clune. 1995b. "School Finance Formulas: Aging Structures of Renovation." Paper prepared for the Consortium for Policy Research in Education, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ. Draft.
Odden, A. R., and L.O. Picus. 1992. School Finance: A Policy Perspective. New York: McGraw Hill.
Picus, L.O., and L. Hertert. 1993. "A School Finance Dilemma for Texas: Achieving Equity in a Time of Fiscal Constraint." Texas Researcher 4: 1-27.
Picus, L. O., and L.A. Toenjes. 1994. "Texas School Finance: Assessing the Equity Impact of Multiple Reforms." Journal of Texas Public Education 2(3): 39-62.
Purkey, S.C., and M.S. Smith. 1983. "Effective Schools: A Review." The Elementary School Journal 83(4): 427-452.
Ralph, J., D. Keller, and J. Crouse. 1994. "How Effective Are American Schools?" Phi Delta Kappan 76(2): 144-150.
Reschovsky, A., and M. Wiseman. 1995. "The Two-Thirds Initiative: A Reform Opportunity Lost?" Occasional Paper Series of the Robert M. La Follette Institute of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Slavin, R.E., L.J. Dolan, and J.A. Madden. November, 1994. "Scaling Up: Lessons Learned in the Dissemination of Success for All." Paper prepared for the Center for Research on the Education of Students Placed at Risk, Johns Hopkins University.
Slavin, R.E., N.A. Madden, and L.J. Dolan. 1994. "Whenever and Wherever We Choose: The Replication of `Success for All.'" Phi Delta Kappan 75(8): 6639-6640.
Smith, M.S., and J. O'Day. 1991. "Systemic School Reform." The Politics of Curriculum and Testing, 1990 Yearbook of the Politics and Education Association. Ed. S. Fuhrman and B. Malen. pp. 233-267. Bristol, PA: Falmer Press.
Trimble, C. Scott, and A. Forsaith. 1995. "Achieving Equity and Excellence in Kentucky Education." University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 28(3): 599-654.
Underwood, J.K. 1995. School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity. University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 28(3): 493-520.
Walker, D.F., and J. Shaffarszick. 1974. "Comparing Curricula." Review of Educational Research 44: 83-111.
Witte, J., et al. 1994. Fourth Year Report: The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program. Madison, WI: Report to the Wisconsin State Legislature.
Zigler, E.F., and M. Finn-Stevenson. 1994. "Schools Role in the Provision of Support Services for Children and Families: A Critical Aspect of Program Equity." Educational Policy 8(4): 591-606.
